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DISCRETIONARILY ENHANCED SENTENCES
BASED UPON SUSPECTED PERJURY AT TRIAL
I. Introduction
Historically, a judge has had wide discretion in sentencing a con-
victed defendant with respect to the length of sentence to be im-
posed and the sources and types of information used to determine
an appropriate sentence.' The sentence which the judge sets is
directly dependent upon the information he elects to consider!
Since the primary aims of imprisonment are the reformation and
rehabilitation of the defendant, 3 the judge does not base his sen-
tencing decision upon the crime alone. Rather, he also considers
those factors which he deems indicative of the defendant's re-
habilitative needs.4 Though judges weigh many factors in this re-
gard when sentencing, several circuits have recently questioned the
propriety of judges considering their belief that the defendant com-
mitted or suborned perjury' at trial.
1. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). While jury sentencing is a legitimate
practice, generally it is the trial (sentencing) judge who decides what, if any, sentence to
impose upon a defendant at a post trial sentencing hearing. To guide the judge the legislature
fixes a range of permissible penalties for any given statutory crime. When sentencing a
defendant within this range, the judge may set a single sentence, a minimum-maximum
sentencing term or an indeterminate sentence in which the defendant is to be imprisoned.
See 18 FED. R. CriM. PROC. 32(a); ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES
AND PROCEDURES § 2.3, at 63-64, § 2.4, at 74, § 2.5, at 80-82 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
SENTENCING STANDARDS]; G. MUELLER, SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PURPOSE (1977); S. RUSIN,
LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 81-126 (1973).
2. Regardless of what aggravating or mitigating factors the judge considers, however, the
imposition of sentence cannot be greater than the statutory maximum for the crime of which
the defendant was convicted. See Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1978). Still
one commentator has noted, "[nJowhere else in the criminal process is so much power
trusted to the knowledge, instincts, and conscience of a judicial officer." Drew, Judicial
Discretion and the Sentencing Process, 17 How. L. REv. 858, 859 (1973).
3. 337 U.S. at 248.
4. Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); But see Bernard, Individualization v.
Uniformity: The Case for Regulation in Criminal Justice, 40 FED. PROB. 19 (1976); Wyzanski,
A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1292 (1952).
5. Perjury is defined by federal statute, providing in pertinent part:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any
case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered,
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony,
declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, wilfully and contrary
to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
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The traditional view taken by the federal courts has been to allow
the suspected perjury to be considered by the judge inasmuch as it
provides a telltale characteristic of the defendant and his chances
for rehabilitation.' To exclude it from the sentencing process would
undermine the accurate evaluation the judge attempts to make of
the defendant for imposing a just sentence.7 Circuits opposed to this
practice conclude, however, that before a judge enhances a sentence
based upon his suspicion of perjury, the defendant is entitled to
receive a fair trial on that issue. The defendant has been denied his
constitutional right to plead not guilty and have the protection of
those inherent safeguards provided in an indictment and trial for
perjury. The defendant has been penalized for perjury which he
may not have committed and for which he may still be subsequently
prosecuted in a separate proceeding.
This Note will trace briefly the history surrounding a judge's dis-
cretionary use of information in sentencing. It will then examine
how the circuits have dealt with increased penalties based upon the
judge's belief that the defendant committed perjury during trial and
how recent Supreme Court decisions have balanced this against the
defendant's due process right to a fair trial for perjury.
II. Information Considered Before Setting Sentence
In order to determine an appropriate sentence, the judge must
first familiarize himself with all relevant information concerning the
defendant's background and character. This information is drawn
true. . . . is guilty of perjury ....
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976). Section 1622 provides that "[w]hoever procures another to commit
any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury . . . ." Id. § 1622 (1976).
6. Few factors are as relevant for a judge's consideration as a defendant's criminal activ-
ity, including perjury, especially when that activity is closely related to the crime for which
the defendant is charged. United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 843 (1968).
7. See 337 U.S. at 249-50.
8. In an action where a witness testified and was summarily charged and convicted of
contempt and sentenced to sixty days in jail, the United States Supreme Court held
that failure to afford the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against
the charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process of law. A person's
right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in
his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to
offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
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primarily from the pre-sentence investigative report,9 evidence pre-
sented at trial, and the judge's personal observation of the defen-
dant's behavior in the courtroom. 0 Recently, a federal statute was
enacted extending this scope of inquiry by providing that no limita-
tions shall be placed upon the sources or types of information a
judge may consider in sentencing." However, even before this stat-
ute was enacted, judges had exercised broad discretion over the
information considered in sentencing.
The principal case dealing with the latitude of this discretionary
power is Williams v. New York. 2 In Williams, a jury found the
defendant guilty of first degree murder and recommended life im-
prisonment. However, after reviewing the pre-sentence report on
Williams, which revealed an extensive history of criminal and social
misconduct, the trial judge decided to impose the death sentence. 3
Among the factors he considered were burglaries to which the defen-
dant confessed but was never convicted. 4 The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the death sentence and upheld the complete
judicial discretion of the sentencing judge. The Court found
"[h]ighly relevant-if not essential-to his selection of an appro-
priate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics."'' 5 This has been
interpreted as authorizing judges to consider not only evidence pre-
sented in open court, but also responsible unsworn statements or out
.of court information relative to the circumstances of the crime and
the defendant's background."
Indeed only when a reviewing court believes a judge to have con-
sidered information that is materially untrue and thus not indica-
9. 337 U.S. at 249-50. The pre-sentence report is made available to the judge, upon his
request, from the probation department. 18 FED. R. CrmM. PRoc. 32(c); S. WILLIAMS, THE LAW
OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 12-20 (1974).
10. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973); See Zumwalt, The Anarchy of Sent-
encing in the Federal Courts, 57 JuD. 96, 99 (1973); K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 133-41
(1969); Glueck, Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Justice, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 461 (1958).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976). As stated in Smith v. United States, 551 F.2d 1193 (10tb Cir.
1977), the primary purpose of this statute was to "clearly authorize the trial judge to rely upon
information of alleged criminal activity for which the defendant had not been prosecuted."
Id. at 1196.
12. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
13. Id. at 244.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 247.
16. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959).
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tive of a defendant's rehabiltative needs will the decision be re-
manded for resentencing." In United States v. Tucker,'" the trial
judge in sentencing the defendant for robbery considered prior con-
victions in which he had been denied counsel. While the Supreme
Court acknowledged that "a judge may appropriately conduct an
inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of
information he may consider, or the source from which it may
come,"'" it nevertheless found an abuse of sentencing discretion. 0
The Court reasoned that since the trial judge specifically considered
misinformation of a constitutional magnitude the sentence violated
due process of law.2' The case was remanded to the trial court for a
reconsideration of Tucker's sentence.2
Generally, however, this Court imposed limitation has had mini-
mal effect.2" Federal appellate courts have upheld judicial consider-
ation of many sentencing factors including a defendant's past crim-
nal activity," facts concerning his character,25 past life and habits"
and standing in the community. 7 Not restricted to this out of court
information judges will also consider any trial evidence indicative
of the defendant's rehabilitative needs. Testimony, in particular,
has been found a reliable sentencing factor since it is given under
oath, subject to cross examination and presented while the judge
17. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948).
18. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
19. Id. at 446.
20. The Court applied retroactively to the prior state convictions, which were considered
in sentencing, its holding in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 404 U.S. at 447 n.4.
Gideon guaranteed the right of counsel to any person charged with a crime in a state court
proceeding. 372 U.S. at 344.
21. 404 U.S. at 447.
22. Id. at 449.
23. Absent evidence of some specific materially unreliable factor being made available to
the judge for sentencing, reviewing courts are ordinarily reluctant to question the judge's
sentencing decision. See 334 U.S. at 740.
24. Besides the defendant's past convictions, judges have considered in sentencing:
United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 314 (7th Cir. 1975) (charges of which defendant was
acquitted); United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir. 1973) (convictions reversed
on appeal). See United States v. Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 554 (10th Cir. 1976) (dismissed
charges); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140, 1141 (3d Cir. 1972) (pending charges); Austin
v. United States, 408 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1969) (arrests).
25. United States v. Dent, 477 P.2d 447, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (psychiatric reports on
defendant).
26. United States v. Carden, 428 F.2d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1970) (juvenile defendant's
earlier use of drugs).
27. United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (defendant's relations
with public and police).
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has the opportunity to observe the witness.25 Consequently, when
the defendant testifies the trial judge is able to personally evaluate
one of the more meaningful sources of information considered in
sentencing.
III. The Split Among the Circuits
For over sixty years, federal trial judges have unilaterally in-
creased penalties2 on criminal defendants who, in the judge's belief,
have committed or suborned perjury at trial. For the greater part
of this period appellate courts uncompromisingly sustained these
sentencing decisions. Only during the last decade did several cir-
cuits digress in their approach to this accepted practice.
A. Circuits Supporting a Judge's Consideration of Perjury in
Sentencing
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was the first federal
appellate court to render a decision on a judge's consideration of
perjury in sentencing. In Peterson v. United States, 30 the defendant
was tried and convicted of stealing a forty-cent rubber stamp from
the post office. During the trial, the government introduced testi-
mony to prove that Peterson was also guilty of subornation of per-
jury, a crime for which he had not been indicted.3' Based primarily
on his suspicion that Peterson suborned perjury, the judge imposed
the maximum sentence for larceny of three years.2 Despite its belief
28. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 751 (9th Cir' 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045
(1978); Cook v. Gray, 530 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 980 (1976); United
States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. McCoy, 429 F.2d 739, 743
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
29. See note 2 supra.
30. 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918).
31. Id.
32. While nothing in the record indicated the subornation of perjury induced the three
year sentence, a letter written four months later by the sentencing judge shows that he
considered it.
"Concerning the sentence in the A.T. Peterson case I see no impropriety in my
stating to you the fact that the offense for which the defendant was formally found
guilty by the jury was and is in my opinion rather trifling, and for it a moderate
punishment would have been amply sufficient. However, I became firmly convinced
during the trial and believe now that Peterson was guilty of subornation of perjury of
the most glaring character, and I further took into consideration the fact that the theft
of the post office stamp was committed for an ulterior and decidedly criminal purpose.
The main reason for the severe sentence imposed, however, was the subornation of
perjury."
Id. at 118-19 (quoting letter of Judge Henry Clay McDowell, Western District of Virginia).
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that the sentence was overly severe, the court of appeals upheld the
trial jidge's decision.3 The court refused to sustain the contention
that the judge had abused his discretion in convicting for one crime
and punishing mainly for another.34 Peterson's subornation of per-
jury, the Fourth Circuit found, was clearly reflected in the record
and directly related to the larceny of which he was convicted. 35 Since
subornation of perjury reveals a defendant's criminal inclinations,
the court concluded it was a proper factor for consideration in sent-
encing.31
The Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to consider this issue
again in United States v. Moore.7 In Moore, the defendant was
charged with knowingly receiving a stolen automobile. He was con-
victed and given a four year sentence although he had no prior
criminal record. Among the reasons given to justify such a harsh
sentence was the judge's belief that the defendant committed per-
jury while testifying.
On appeal, Moore requested the Fourth Circuit to reconsider its
holding in Peterson. The court of appeals rejected Moore's request
noting that several other circuits had followed its decision in
Peterson. 3 9 The court cautioned judges, however, regarding the dan-
33. Id. at 119.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973).
38. Id. at 1286-87. The judge stated at the sentencing hearing:
"You took the stand in your own defense, as you have every right to do, but you
testified falsely under oath in an attempt to exculpate yourself from this crime. The
court should take that into account in deciding what is the proper sentence in a case
of this sort."
Id.
39. Id. at 1287. Prior to Moore, four circuits had upheld a judge's consideration of perjury
in sentencing, reasoning along much the same line as the court in Peterson.
In Humes v. United States, 186 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1951), the defendant was found to have
committed and subomed perjury at his trial. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because per-
jury is a serious crime which has a bearing upon a defendant's veracity and hence his chances
for rehabilitation, it is a proper factor for consideration in sentencing. Id. at 878.
The court of appeals in United States v. Levine, 372 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1967), affirmed the
finding of the sentencing judge who had recognized Levine to be perjurer and increased
his sentence accordingly. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that when an enhanced penalty is
allotted, it is based solely on an unfavorable characteristic of the defendant and not on an
independent finding of the substantive crime of perjury. Id. at 74.
In United States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 955 (1970),
the sentencing judge was of the opinion that the defendant's offense, in light of his past,
warranted only probation. However, after determining the defendant's guilt to a practical
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ger of indiscriminately treating every convicted defendant who tes-
tifies as a perjurer.'" A conviction, it noted, only means that the
defendant has been proven guilty of the crime charged, not that he
has committed perjury in testifying to that charge." The majority
suggested that because judges are often misled by the facts or can-
not correctly categorize some essential element of proof, it is best
for the judge who suspects perjury to request an investigation and
possible prosecution by the United States Attorney, where the facts
warrant it, for perjury is a "separate and distinct crime."' 2 Thus,
while the Fourth Circuit did not reverse its decision in Peterson, it
did retreat from the hard-line attitude reflected in the earlier case.
The following year, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Hendrix 3 took a more moderate approach to resolving the sentenc-
ing dilemma. In Hendrix the defendant was tried for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. Defendant Hendrix tes-
tified that he had no knowledge of the cocaine or marijuana found
in his home." However, evidence showed that Hendrix who earned
certainty during trial and then hearing the defendant categorically deny every aspect of the
charges against him, the judge imposed a sentence. The court of appeals affirmed and noted
further that in certain instances the sentencing judge will be censored if he does not consider
that the guilty verdict was inconsistent with the defendant's sworn testimony. Id. at 878
(dictum).
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1972), found
nothing offensive about the judge's comments regarding the less than candid testimony of
the defendant. The court stated that a judge cannot impose a sentence in a mental vacuum.
He must be allowed to consider the defendant's testimony and behavior on the witness stand
if an accurate evaluation of the defendant's rehabilitative needs is to be made. Id. at 754.
40. 484 F.2d at 1287.
41. Id. at 1288.
42. Id. at 1287-88. Judge Craven, dissenting on this issue in Moore, emphatically stated
what was implicit in the majority opinion: a summary adjudication of guilt is a "judgment
by hunch" whereby the defendant is denied every constitutional and procedural safeguard
accorded in an indictment and trial for perjury. This practice, he found, "will inevitably chill
and hamper, if not ultimately destroy, the right to testify in one's ownbehalf." Id. at 1288
(Craven, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Practices that have a chilling effect
on the defendant's right to testify have been found to violate the United States Code which
provides: "In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses against the United
States . . . the person charged shall, at his own request, be a competent witness. ... 18
U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
43. 505 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). Also decided one year
after Moore was Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth Circuit
affirmed a defendant's sentence which was based in part upon the judge's finding of perjury.
The court, noting other circuit decisions on this issue, found it was "by no means clear that
this [perjury] was an impermissible factor" for a judge's consideration. Id. at 939.
44. 505 F.2d at 1234.
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only six to seven thousand dollars annually, had purchased a sixty-
four thousand dollar home and bought a new Cadillac every two
years. 5 According to the trial judge the defendant's testimony
amounted to" 'the most outrageous situation of perjury in any trial'
he had seen" in thirteen years." He decided therefore on the basis
of this finding to "'add about two years'" to the sentence.47
On appeal, Judge Frankel found some merit to the argument that
a judge's consideration of perjury chills the defendant's right to
testify in his own behalf,4" but noted that judges also consider a
defendant's cooperation with law enforcement when, for example,
he tells the truth." The court reasoned that the trial "judge's use
and appraisal of a vivid trial circumstance, after adversary testing,
is scarcely to be deemed less reliable" than other factors weighed
in sentencing.50 Nevertheless, recognizing the need for some safe-
guard to protect the defendant from an arbitrary assessment of
perjury, the Second Circuit held that a judge must be convinced
"beyond a reasonable doubt" of the defendant's perjury.5
In upholding the trial judge's sentencing decision the court of
appeals found the jury could not possibly have convicted Hendrix
of drug possession without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
he deliberately and wilfully lied on the stand.2 Thus, the judge had
properly considered his suspicion of perjury as a factor in sentenc-
ing." The purpose behind the Second Circuit's use of the "beyond
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1235.
48. Id. at 1236. See note 42 supra.
49. 505 F.2d at 1236. In analyzing the problem a judge confronts when sentencing a
defendant, Judge Frankel stated:
The effort to appraise "character" is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessarily
an enterprise for which judges are notably equipped by prior training. Yet it is in our
existing scheme of sentencing one clue to the rational exercise of discretion. If the
notion of "repentence" is out of fashion today, the fact remains that a manipulative
defiance of the law is not a cheerful datum for the prognosis a sentencing judge under-
takes.
Id.
50. Id. at 1235.
51. Id. at 1236.
52. Id. at 1237.
53. In United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1976), the defendant was given an
increased penalty because he changed his testimony during the trial. The Fifth Circuit,
although it relied upon Hendrix in upholding the trial judge's decision, did not adopt the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard for unilateral perjury considerations. Id. at 960.
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a reasonable doubt" standard is simply to compel the judge to weigh
the defendant's testimony against all the conflicting trial evidence.
If the evidence did not sustain a finding of perjury beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, the judge would be required to bypass his consideration
of that issue in sentencing and leave the entire matter to the IJnited
States Attorney for possible prosecution,5 as was recommended in
Moore.55 By providing such guidance to trial judges, the Fourth and
Second Circuits emphasized the requirement that a judge base his
sentencing decision solely upon reliable information.
B. Circuits Opposed to a Judge's Consideration of Perjury in
Sentencing
The District of Columbia was the first circuit to deviate from the
accepted practice of permitting judges to independently label a de-
fendant's testimony perjurous and enhance his sentence accord-
ingly. In Scott v. United States,5 the defendant denied any partici-
pation in the robbery of which he was subsequently convicted. 7
During the sentencing hearing the judge repeatedly stated his belief
that Scott had lied while on the witness stand.5" On the basis of the
judge's remarks, Scott appealed contending that the judge had
abused his discretion in sentencing him.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the
case for resentencing holding that it was to be done without any
consideration of the suspected perjury.59 Chief Judge Bazelon, writ-
ing for the court, noted that if the judge in fact imposed a harsher
penalty as a result of the alleged perjury, then the defendant had
plainly been denied a trial for that offense. 0 To support its position,
the court of appeals maintained that a defendant's denial of guilt
does not reflect his rehabilitative needs. The court reasoned that
"[i]t is indeed unlikely that many men who commit serious offen-
ses would balk on principle from lying in their own defense."'" Yet
even if a defendant was fully repentent, the court continued, he
might testify falsely when threatened with the thought of imprison-
54. 505 F.2d at 1236-37.
55. 484 F.2d at 1288.
56. 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
57. Id. at 268.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 266.
60. Id. at 269.
61. Id.
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ment and the stigma of a conviction.2 This tenuous relationship
between a defendant's testimony and his rehabilitative needs be-
comes apparent when the penitent defendant, succumbs to the pe-
culiar pressure prison puts upon him and falsely testifies, subse-
quently receiving an enhanced sentence for perjury. 3 Furthermore,
the court of appeals noted the needlessness of another form of de-
terrence for perjury. Since a defendant is already concerned about
the jury discerning his untruthful testimony and convicting him,
and the United States Attorney subsequently prosecuting him, any
further punishment, the court believed, would have little deterrent
effect at best.6" The District of Columbia Circuit, though presenting
unique and convincing arguments, was not joined in its holding
against enhanced sentencing on the basis of suspected perjury until
the Third Circuit decided United States v. Grayson.5
In Grayson, the defendant was tried for escaping from a federal
prison where he was serving a three-year sentence for distributing a
controlled substance. His sole defense was duress. Grayson
claimed that he owed gambling debts to fellow inmates and was
forced to flee prison when threats were made upon his life.67 After
Grayson was convicted, the judge stated at the sentencing, "it is my
view that your defense was a complete fabrication without the
slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper for me to consider that
fact in sentencing, and I will do so.""e
Grayson, relying upon a principle established by the Third Cir-
cuit in Poteet v. Fauver," appealed the sentencing decision. In
Poteet, the defendant was charged with robbery and maintained his
innocence first throughout the trial and then during the sentencing
hearing where he rejected the judge's post-conviction attempts to
coerce a confession of guilt. 0 Thereafter Poteet received a fourteen
62. Id.
63. Additionally, one questions whether the defendant who refuses to admit his wrongdo-
ing and plea bargains his way to a lesser sentence is a better prospect for rehabilitation than
the penitent defendant who perjures himself thus receiving a substantially greater penalty.
Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66
YAz L.J. 204, 217 (1956).
64. 419 F.2d at 269.
65. 550 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1977).'
66. Id. at 104.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 106.
69. 517 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1975).
70. Id. at 394-95.
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to sixteen year sentence while his co-defendant received a five year
sentence after admitting his guilt at sentencing.7'
Emphasizing the unconstitutionality of the judge's post trial
statements, 72 the Third Circuit in Poteet remanded the case for
resentencing. The court elaborated on this issue, stating that, "[a]
defendant has a right to defend, and although he is not privileged
to commit perjury in that defense, the sentencing judge may not add
a penalty because he believes the defendant lied.17 There having
been no charge, hearing or conviction of perjury, a punishment for
that crime would violate the defendant's due process rights. 7 A
heavier penalty would also unduly burden the defendant's right to
defend, as his mere denial of a charge under oath might lead to
successive punishments for that crime.75
In Grayson, nevertheless, the Third Circuit initially upheld the
judge's sentencing decision, finding the factual setting of Poteet to
be dramatically different.7 Upon rehearing, however, the court of
appeals found that Grayson's reliance upon Poteet was not mis-
placed 77 and that the Third Circuit prohibited a judge from enhanc-
ing a defendant's sentence based on his belief that the defendant
perjured himself at trial.7" By so extending the principle in Poteet
71. Id. at 394. While no reference was made at sentencing that the judge imposed a
harsher sentence on Poteet because he refused to admit his guilt, the court of appeals was
"not convinced that an increment of prison time was not added to Poteet's sentence because
he persisted in maintaining his innocence after the jury had returned a guilty verdict." Id.
at 398. The court was able to infer that Poteet received a harsher sentence based on the trial
judge's statement to the co-defendant immediately after his admission of guilt. The judge
stated, "[tihat saved you ten years .... If you hadn't come clean I don't mind telling you
I was going to send you to State Prison for ten to twelve years." Id. at 397. See note 23 supra.
72. Id. at 396-98.
73. Id. at 395.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 395-96. See note 42 supra.
76. 550 F.2d at 105. The Third Circuit in Grayson, initially interpreted Poteet as a case
solely involving a judge's unsuccessful attempts to compel a defendant to confess under the
threat of imposing a longer sentence, thereby forcing Poteet to waive his fifth amendment
right to be free from self-incrimination. The Poteet court of appeals decision somewhat
justifies this interpretation. The court no less than three times explicitly phrased the issue
as whether a sentencing judge could subject a defendant to an additional penalty because he
refused to admit his guilt. 517 F.2d at 394, 396 & 397.
77. "Although the colloquy between the judge and the defendant that took place in Poteet
occurred during sentencing, it resulted from Poteet's defense at trial, on which the sentencing
judge focused." United States v. Grayson, 550 F.2d at 106 (emphasis in original).
78. Id. Judge Rosenn dissented in Grayson on two grounds. Id. at 109-14 (Rosenn, J.,
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
to Grayson's facts the Third Circuit held that the judge's unilateral
consideration of perjury was an improper factor in sentencing."5
Grayson was appealed by the Government to the United States
Supreme Court.
IV. United States v. Grayson
The grant of certiorari in United States v. Grayson"° gave the
Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve the conflict that had been
created among the Circuits. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
majority, initially presented a historical analysis of Williams v. New
York and its progeny.8 He found that since sentencing required a
consideration of the defendant's whole person and personality,
any exclusion of relevant information would "degenerate into a
game of chance" the judge's attempt to achieve an appropriate and
rational sentence. 2 A defendant's conduct at trial and his testi-
money under oath fall within the ambit of relevant information
whenever they shed some light of the sentencing decision.83 Thus,
with a finding that Williams fully supported its decision, the
Supreme Court held that a judge may properly consider his belief
in sentencing that the defendant committed perjury at trial. 4
The Court went on to reason that since both the defendant's and
dissenting). First, he did not feel bound to Poteet because there was "absolutely no indication
that Poteet received a harsher sentence because he testified falsely." Id. at 110 (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting). See note 76 supra. Secondly, based on his test of two safeguards for protecting
the defendant's rights he found the defendant guilty of perjury. This test consisted of applying
the Hendrix standard, that the sentencing judge be convinced "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the defendant lied before considering the perjury. Then, there "must be no possibility
that the substantive law applied was such that the factfinder could have believed the defen-
dant's testimony at the same time it found him guilty." 550 F.2d at 114 (Rosenn, J., dissent-
ing).
79. Id. at 107. A subsequent case, United States v. Sneath, 557 F.2d 149, 151 n.2 (8th
Cir. 1977), interpreted Grayson as largely refusing to allow a judge to consider suspected
perjury when it would interfere with the defendant's statutory right to testify in his own
behalf at trial. See note 75 supra. The Eighth Circuit distinguished Grayson, Poteet and Scott
and found that since Sneath's lying occurred outside the courtroom, during an F.B.I. investi-
gation, the lies were a proper subject for judicial consideration. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that since Hess v. United States, 496 F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974), allowed judges to
take into account their suspicions of perjury when sentencing, this type of information was
certainly permissible. 557 F.2d at 151. See note 43 supra.
80. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
81. Id. at 45-52.
82. Id. at 53.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 53-54. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
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the government's interests in avoiding irrationality in sentencing
are of the highest order, this more than justifies Grayson's asserted
due process deprivations." Furthermore, there was a serious
doubt whether an "exclusionary rule," as suggested by Grayson,
could ever actually prevent a judge from considering his suspicion
of perjury in sentencing."6 Only the judge's integrity and fidelity to
his oath of office, the Court believed, would seem to provide the
adequate assurances against such an improper consideration." In
response to Grayson's statutory argument that a judge's considera-
tion of perjury "chills" the defendant's right to testify in his own
behalf, the Court found that this right extends only to truthful
testimony and is not intended to benefit the defendant who chooses
to lie on the stand.u The Court reasoned, nonetheless, that once a
defendant is made aware of the sentencing process and the fact that
the judge evaluates his testimony against all conflicting trial evi-
dence, the defendant will testify truthfully."9
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion, chose not to assume that
Grayson testified falsely. He explained that solely because an indi-
vidual judge thinks a defendant has lied at trial does not mean his
finding is true." Nor does this situation change, he continued, when
the increased sentence is viewed merely as a reflection of a defen-
dant's prospects for rehabilitation." The defendant still fears receiv-
ing an increased sentence based upon the unreviewable independent
assessment of the sentencing judge.9" Justice Stewart suggested that
the majority should have prescribed some limitation or safeguard to
minimize the defendant's fear of being unilaterally sentenced for
85. 438 U.S. at 53. The Court thus minimized the importance of Grayson's "constitutional
argument that the District Court's sentence constitutes punishment for the crime of perjury
for which he has not been indicted, tried or convicted by due process." Id.
86. Id. at 54.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 55. See note 42 supra.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 55 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart stated:
In essence, the Court holds today that whenever a defendant testifies in his own behalf
and is found guilty, he opens himself up to the possibility of an enhanced sentence.
Such a sentence is nothing more nor less than a penalty imposed on the defendant's
exercise of his constitutional and statutory rights to plead not guilty and to testify in
his own behalf.
Id. at 56-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 56-57 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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perjury. 3 Moreover, he questioned whether a single instance of un-
truthful testimony could ever influence a defendant's chances for
rehabilitation enough to warrant a perceptibly greater penalty.94
Assuming, nonetheless, that an enhanced sentence for suspected
perjury is warranted, the Court in Grayson did not explore the ex-
tent to which a judge may appropriately exercise unfettered discre-
tion in imposing sentence. Whether a judge may enhance the defen-
dant's sentence on the basis of suspected perjury beyond the stat-
utory maximum authorized for perjury5 is still an unresolved issue.
Yet even where the defendant's sentence is enhanced within the
statutory maximum for perjury, it is unclear whether the sentence
will remain unchanged if he is acquitted in a subsequent trial for
perjury. Thus, while Grayson settled the dilemma of whether ajudge could properly consider his suspicion of perjury in sentencing,
it cannot be deemed the definitive case on the perjury-sentencing
issue.
V. United States v. Moriani
Exactly one week after the Supreme Court decided Grayson, it
summarily disposed of a similar case, United States v. Moriani.9"
Defendant Moriani, like defendant Grayson, was found to have
committed perjury by the sentencing judge. Unlike Grayson, how-
ever, Moriani allegedly committed his perjury while testifying at
the trial of a co-defendant.
93. Id. at 57 (Stewart, J., dissenting). To alleviate the chilling effect a judge's arbitrary
consideration of perjury has on the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf, Justice
Stewart chose to apply Judge Rosenn's standard. See note 78 supra. He found, where Judge
Rosenn had been wrong, that Grayson was not necessarily guilty of any perjury when he
testified as to the duress he was under. Justice Stewart, applying the substantive law (Ro-
senn's second of two requirements) of the case, stated:
Contrary to Judge Rosenn, I do not believe that the latter requirement was met in
this case. The jury could have believed Grayson's entire story but concluded, in the
words of the trial judge's instructions on the defense of duress, that "an ordinary man"
would not "have felt it necessary to leave the Allenwood Prison Camp when faced with
the same'degree of compulsion, coercion or duress as the Defendant was faced with in
this case."
Id. at 57 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
94. Id. at 56 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Twenty years earlier, Judge Potter Stewart
noted, "it is an anomaly that a jddicial system which has developed so scrupulous a concern
for the protection of a criminal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings
against him should have so neglected this most important dimension [imposing a just sent-
ence] of fundamental justice." Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958).
95. The maximum sentence for perjury, under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, is five years. The maxi-
mum sentence for subornation of perjury, under 18 U.S.C. § 1622, is two years.
96. 438 U.S. 910 (1978).
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Moriani had pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was awaiting
sentence when he took the stand at co-defendant Murphy's trial. In
an attempt to exculpate Murphy, Moriani falsely testified that
Murphy had never participated in the robbery.!' After weighing this
testimony and his belief that Moriani deliberately lied at his own
sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge gave. Moriani the maxi-
mum twenty year sentence." On appeal, the Third Circuit extended
its holding in Grayson to control the situation presented here." The
court reversed not only on the ground that the judge had considered
Moriani's suspected perjury at the co-defendant's trial, but also
because he had considered his belief that Moriani lied during the
sentencing hearing.10 In the United States Supreme Court, the case
was vacated and remanded to the court of appeals for further con-
sideration in light of United States v. Grayson. 101 Thus, the Supreme
Court has indicated that a sentencing judge may properly consider
a defendant's suspected perjury even when it occurs at the trial of
another.
Moriani, however, should be limited to its facts. The judge who
sentenced Moriani also presided at Murphy's trial and, therefore,
was able to personally observe Moriani give his testimony in light
of all the other evidence presented at trial. His first-hand impres-
sions enabled him to evaluate carefully, under the Grayson
rationale, his suspicion that Moriani lied during the trial.'"'
The sentencing judge's presence at trial afforded him not only a
better comprehension of the defendant's testimony, but a better
97. United States v. Adams, 555 F.2d 353 (3d Cir. 1977). An F.B.I. agent testified that
Moriani had told him before trial that he [Moriani] would lie if need be to exculpate Murphy
from a robbery conviction. Id. at 356 n.7.
98. Id. at 357.
99. Id. at 359.
100. The Third Circuit reasoned:
While we concede that a comparison of Moriani's testimony at his plea proceeding with
his sentencing reveals appreciable and significant differences, even without the rule
of Poteet [a man must be charged and accorded a hearing before being punished] we
would be most reluctant to permit punishment by added prison time for what perhaps
could have been no more than the product of a faulty memory.
Id. at 360. The court further found that the trial judge erred in his attempted recall of the
prior plea proceeding. Id.
101. 438 U.S. 41 (1978). Even without the Supreme Court's decision in Grayson, however,
the Third Circuit's reversal on the ground that the trial judge considered Moriani's suspected
lying during the post-trial sentencing hearing appears to be clearly incorrect. Moriani was
not then testifying under oath and hence not. subject to perjury.
102. In Grayson the Court held, "we are reaffirming the authority of a sentencing judge
to evaluate carefully a defendant's testimony on the stand . 438 U.S. at 55 (emphasis
added).
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overall understanding of the defendant's character. The opportunity
to appraise a defendant's demeanor, while testifying, is what largely
confers meaning to a judge's determination of whether perjury ex-
ists. Where the courts can require the sentencing judge to preside
at the defendant's trial or in the alternative permit the use of
second-hand information in sentencing for suspected perjury the
choice should be an obvious one where the defendant's freedom may
be at stake.0 3
VI. Conclusion
Perjury demonstrates a lack of respect for societal rules and there-
fore, may provide some indication of a defendant's need for rehabili-
tation. A judge's unilateral finding amid the fast moving, emotional
context of a criminal trial is not, however, a reliable method for
determining the issue of perjury. Congress has provided a separate
process through which a defendant may be indicted and have his
guilt or innocence of perjury reliably and ultimately determined."°4
The inequity of a judge's consideration of perjury is compounded
when no reference is made at the sentencing hearing to the specific
factors considered.' 05 The defendant should know he is being sent-
enced in part for perjury if the punishment for that crime is to have
any rehabilitative affect.
Justice requires, at the very least, that the defendant be accorded
an impartial and informed sentencing. Such protection could be
provided by: (1) having the judge base his finding on a standard
comparable to that required for conviction of the substantive crime
103. Without such an applicable rule the defendant might be sentenced by a judge who,
after simply reading trial transcript, believed the defendant to have committed perjury while,
the judge who tried the case and saw the defendant testify may have felt that no such perjury
existed. See SENTrENCING STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 5.1(a), at 231-32.
104. In addition to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1622, see note 5 supra, Congress has provided in
§ 1623 an alternative to perjury prosecutions under section 1621. 18 U.S.C. 0 1623 applies
only in a situation where the defendant has committed perjury during trial or in a grand jury
proceeding. It allows the United States Attorney to forego certain evidentiary proof (i.e., the
two-witness rule) unique to perjury prosecutions. See generally Salzman, Recantation of
Perjured Testimony, 67 J. CraM. L. 273 (1976); Comment, Perjury: The Forgotten Offense,
65 J. CaiM. L. 361, 370-71 (1974); Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentence, 66 YAsz L.J. 204, 212 (1956).
105. "It is well established. . . that generally a trial judge is under no obligation to give
reasons for his sentencing decision, although it might well be the better practice for him to
do so." United States v. Donner, 528 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1976); see Frankel, Lawless-
ness in Sentencing, 41 U. CN. L. Rxv. 1, 9-10 (1972); SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 1,
§ 5.6(ii), at 269.
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of perjury (a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard) and (2) having
the judge specifically state, along with other factors, that a consider-
ation of perjury was included in sentencing and the circumstances
which led him to that finding.'10 This latter safeguard would not
only make the defendant aware of the reasons for his punishment,
but also afford him the same right of appeal as he would have in a
separate perjury proceeding. 07 These safeguards will, furthermore,
compel the judge to carefully evaluate his suspicion that the defen-
dant lied before imposing an increased sentence.'"s Until such prac-
tices are adopted, unilateral determinations of perjury will continue
to be used to suit the bias of the particular judge, rather than to
meet the needs of the individual defendant.
Robert M. Wetterer
106. Under the Criminal Reform Bill the judge, at the time of sentencing the defendant,
must state in open court his reasons for imposition of the particular sentence. S. 1437, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 2003(b) (1978); SENTENCING STANDARDS, supra note 1, § 5.6(i), (ii), at 269.
107. Violations of due process that have been legitimately subjected to appellate review
include: judge's reasons not being given for a harsher sentence at defendant's retrial (North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969)); defendant not afforded counsel at sentencing
(Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)); increased penalty because defendant insisted on a
trial (United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975)).
108. "Society ought to have as much interest in seeing that the prisoner is protected from
arbitrary sentencing as in seeing that he is protected from arbitrary conviction. . . ." Note,
Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felonies, 81 HAiv. L. Rav. 821, 827 (1968).
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